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MARRIAGE MAKES CENTS: HOW 
LAW & ECONOMICS JUSTIFIES 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
RYAN NISHIMOTO* 
THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN 
LAW. By Andrew Koppelman. Chicago and London: the University of 
Chicago Press 2002. Pp. 154. 
Abstract: Andrew Koppelman's book presents the legal and moral case 
for gay equality. He contends that various arguments, such as privacy 
and sex discrimination, justify the equal treatment of gay men and 
lesbians. By analogizing the struggle for equality to the debate 
surrounding same-sex marriage, Koppelman suggests that although 
change will come, the courts are presently too far ahead of public 
opinion to recognize same-sex marriage. This Book Review examines 
how law and economics removes the debate to a pragmatic theater, 
compelling recognition of same-sex marriage. 
Disputes about homosexuality evoke visceral emotions. l Religious 
views, stereotypes, and social pressures all contribute to the negative 
preconceptions of gay men and lesbians, and the public discourse on 
homosexuality has long been dominated by disgust, confusion, and 
ignorance.2 Thus, efforts of gay men and lesbians to seek legal recog-
nition and validation for their relationships have been faced with hos-
tility, largely derived from these negative cultural attitudes, rather 
than from any internallogic.3 
Andrew Koppelman confronts this prejudice in his book, The Gay 
Rights QJlestion in Contemporary American Law.4 Historically, the United 
States Supreme Court has been hesitant to identify gay men and les-
bians as a suspect class; therefore it has not applied heightened scru-
* Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAw JOURNAL (2002-2003). 
1 Gary Chartier, Natural Law, Same-Sex Marriage, and the Politics of Virtue, 48 UCLA L. 
REv. 1593, 1599 (2001). 
2 See Jack M. Battaglia, Religion, Sexual Orientation, and Self-Realization: First Amendment 
Principles and Anti-Discrimination Laws, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 189, 204 (1999); Timothy 
E. Lin, Social Norms and Judicial Decisionmaking: Examining the Role of Narratives in Same-Sex 
Adoption Cases, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 739, 741 (1999). 
g William N. Eskridge, A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419, 1423 (1993). 
4 ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN 
LAW 35 (2002). 
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tiny to laws that discriminate against them.5 Koppelman attacks the 
constitutionality of such discriminatory laws on the basis of privacy 
and sex discrimination.6 
Koppelman next debunks the defenses made in support of laws 
that discriminate against gay men and lesbians.7 To do this, he ob-
serves that the general question of legal equality for homosexuals is a 
paradigm of the specific issue of same-sex marriage.s That is, if het-
erosexual marriage (and by implication, heterosexuality) is able to 
achieve a distinctive good that same-sex marriage (or homosexuality) 
cannot achieve, then Koppelman suggests that the traditional 
definition of marriage as strictly heterosexual may be defensible.9 On 
the other hand, if same-sex marriage could achieve ends that are 
equally valued as those achieved by heterosexual couples, then the 
legal discriminations against same-sex couples are arbitrary and inde-
fensible. Io Koppelman quickly disposes of the bulk of common objec-
tions to homosexuality, arguing that the claims rest on faulty logic or 
false empirical claims.II 
Unfortunately, Koppelman does not devote more of this chapter 
to criticizing the tendency of same-sex marriage critics to dwell in 
moral arguments and ignore the pragmatic. I2 Koppelman structures a 
5 See Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 
49 UCLA L. REV. 471, 483 (2001). Strict scrutiny is applied to legislation that affects race, 
which requires that the legislation be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 
KOPPELMAN, supra note 4, at 9-10. Minimal scrutiny is applied to most other legislation, 
which asks whether legislation is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Id. at 10. 
Intermediate scrutiny requires legislation to be substantially related to a legitimate state 
interest. Id. The Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether homosexuals consti-
tute a "discrete and insular minority" so as to trigger heightened or intermediate scrutiny. 
Stein, supra, at 482-83. 
6 KOPPELMAN, supra note 4, at 35, 53. The right to privacy is not an enumerated right, 
but can nonetheless trigger heightened review of legislation if it affects the right to marry 
or divorce, the right of married and unmarried persons to use contraceptives, the right of 
extended families to live together, or the right to abortion. Id. at 35 (citing Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to marry); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right 
to marry); Thrner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (right to marry); Boddie v. Connecticut, 
401 U.S. 371 (1971) (right to divorce); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1975) (right 
to use contraceptives); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right to use contracep-
tives); Careyv. Population Servs., 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (right to use contraceptives); Moore 
v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (right to live together); Roe v. Wade,. 410 U.S. 113 
(1973) (right to abortion)). 
7 See id. at 73. 
SId. 
g Id. 
10 KOPPELMAN, supra note 4, at 73. 
11 See id. 
12 See id. at 72-93. 
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coherent moral defense to the traditional moral arguments posited by 
new natural law theorists, concluding that the gender of one's partner 
is a morally insignificant factor in evaluating sexual conduct.13 How-
ever, he stops short of advocating a full recognition of same-sex mar-
riage, deferring to the emotional concerns of critics.14 This Book Re-
view will extend Koppelman's defense of same-sex marriage by 
demonstrating how a cost-benefit perspective fully justifies its recogni-
tion. 
Part I will explain how to escape the emotionally-charged moral-
ity arguments of same-sex marriage by using law and economics, 
which provides a pragmatic and rational approach toward the 
justification of same-sex marriage. Part II will describe how same-sex 
couples can gain some of the legal benefits of marriage by contracting 
their relationships, but ultimately rejects this "solution" as costly and 
insufficient. Part III will explore the legal alternatives that same-sex 
couples have in becoming domestic partnerships or civil unions. Such 
efforts are insufficient, however, because limiting same-sex relation-
ships to these terms and refusing to recognize the couple as "married" 
sends a message that these unions are second-class units and not to be 
mistaken for marriages. By contrast, this section will also weigh soci-
ety's transactional cost in recognizing same-sex unions as "marriages." 
I. LAW, ECONOMICS, AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: A PRAGMATIC 
APPROACH TO AN EMOTIONAL DEBATE 
A majority of Americans presently oppose same-sex marriage.15 
These attitudes are strongly motivated by religious beliefs and an 
emotional response to deeply-held and preconceived notions against 
homosexuality.16 Critics of same-sex marriage commonly make moral 
15 Id. at 73, 93. 
14 Id. at 72-93. 
15 See Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 
1996 B.Y.V. L. REv. 1,57 (stating that two-thirds of Americans oppose same-sex marriage). 
16 See John G. Culhane, "Clanging Silence": Same-Sex Couples and Tort Law, 89 Ky. LJ. 
911,938 (2000-01); Eskridge, supra note 3, at 1423 (suggesting that hostility to same-sex 
marriage stems not from logic, but rather from negative cultural attitudes); Michael Wald, 
Same-Sex Couple Marriage: A Family Perspective, 9 VA. J. Soc. POL'y & L. 291, 292 (2001); see 
also Elvia Rosales Arriola, Sexual Identity and the Constitution: Homosexual Persons as a Discrete 
and Insular Minority, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REp. 263, 285 (1992) (finding that discrimination 
against homosexuals is closely related to deeply held gender-specific social and sexual roles 
within a culture); Battaglia, supra note 2, at 203-04 (stating that religious beliefs are his-
torically used to justify discrimination against homosexuals); Lin, supra note 2, at 758 (ob-
serving that fear, hatred, and stigmatization have defined attitudes toward gay and lesbian 
Americans, who have been derided as "faggots," "monsters," "fairies," "bull dykes,· "per-
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arguments, alleging that the immorality of same-sex conduct or rela-
tionships justifies the traditional definition of marriage as exclusively 
heterosexual.17 Because marriage is closely related to morality and 
values, it is often difficult to convince people to make objective as-
sessments of the data and enter into a reasonable debate.1s Unfortu-
nately, this emotional approach occludes the economic realities faced 
by same-sex couples.19 A rational choice model, on the other hand, 
addresses the costs that the couple and society incur through con tin-
verts," "freaks," and "queers" and whose relationships have been labeled "abominations," 
"crimes against nature," and "sins not fit to be named among the Christians"); Nancy D. 
Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children 
in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. LJ. 459, 549 (1990) (recogniz-
ing that many people think homosexuality immoral because of religious beliefs). 
17 David B. Cruz, 'lust Don't Call it Marriage": The First Amendment and Marriage as an 
Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 925, 1008 (2001). Morality arguments were routine 
during the debates of the Federal Defense of Marriage Act, where congressional leaders 
decried same-sex marriage as "trendy moral relativism" and decried its advocates as "bent 
on forcing a tortured view of morality on the rest of the country." Id. at 1008 (citing 142 
CONGo REc. S4947 (1996) (statement of Sen. Coats) and 142 CONGo REc. H7482 (1996) 
(statement of Rep. Barr), respectively). Other representatives thought it improper for 
government to "treat homosexual relationships as morally equivalent to heterosexual rela-
tionships" and that doing so would "legitimize unnatural and immoral behavior." Id. (cit-
ing 142 CONGo REC. H7491 (1996) (statement of Rep. Canady); citing 142 CONGo REC. 
H7494 (1996) (statement of Rep. Smith». 
18 See KOPPELMAN, supra note 4, at 72; Carlos A. Ball, Sexual Ethics and Postmodernism in 
Gay Rights Philosophy, 80 N.C. L. REv. 371, 373 (2002) [hereinafter Ball, Sexual Ethics]; Car-
los A. Ball, Moral Foundations for a Discourse on Same-Sex Marriage: Looking Beyond Political 
Liberalism, 85 GEO. LJ. 1871, 1878 (1997) [hereinafter Ball, MoraIFoundations]; Wald, supra 
note 16, at 339. Mter questioning the prejudice against gay and lesbians, Koppelman also 
posits that the central claim of gay liberation is based in morality. KOPPELMAN, supra note 
4, at 72. Thus, he realizes that he is put in the "awkward position" of having to prove that 
"there is no good reason to regard the sex of one's partner as a morally significant factor 
in evaluating sexual conduct. Id. at 72-73. 
19 See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to Rec-
ognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 745, 749-51 (1995) (implying that questions 
surrounding the morality of same-sex marriage are distinct from, and fail to account for, 
economic concerns); Darren Bush, Moving to the Left by Moving to the Right: A Law & Eco-
nomics Defense of Same-Sex Marriage, 22 WOMEN'S Rrs. L. REP. 115, 116-17, 126 (2001) (criti-
cizing law and economics theorists who justifY non-intervention in heterosexual marriage 
on economic terms but who accept prohibitions on same-sex marriage because of the 
moral considerations); Tobin A. Sparling, All in the Family: Recognizing the Unifying Potential 
of Same-Sex Marriage, 10 LAw & SEXUALI'IY 187, 197 (2001) (stating that judges and law-
makers have a duty to look beyond moral and religious principles when addressing same-
sex marriage); Wald, supra note 16, at 339 (lamenting that failure to make assessments of 
objective data influences politicians and scholars alike to ignore evidence and oppose 
same-sex couple marriage). 
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ued prohibition of same-sex marriage.20 Such a model can be found 
in the school of thought known as law and economics.21 
A. Background oj Law and Economics 
Law and economics proposes legal rules which are to be estab-
lished and reviewed in light of fundamental economic principles.22 
Underlying these economic principles is the assumption that people 
strive to maximize their utility from a set of preferences.23 These pref-
erences are chosen by accumulating an optimal amount of informa-
tion from a variety of sources.24 Simply defined, economics can be 
understood as rational choice, in which resources are limited in rela-
tion to human desires.25 Rational choice, however, need not be con-
scious; it merely predicts that one will choose means to achieve ends 
at the least possible cost.26 
Law and economics theorists conclude that that government in-
tervention in most transactions inevitably produces negative out-
comes because such intervention is inherently flawed. 27 Rather than 
submitting to government regulation, private parties are better situ-
ated to make their own decisions, with very specific and limited ex-
ceptions.28 In general, government intervention produces 
inefficiencies.29 At best, government tampering with the marketplace 
20 Bush, supra note 19, at 116-17; Wald, supra note 16, at 339; Jeremy Waldron, Ego-
Bloated Hove~ 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 597, 611 (2000); see auo Ball, MoralFoundations, supra note 
18, at 1942 (arguing that societal acceptance of same-sex marriage is dependent upon 
"communal recognition" that such unions are "normatively good"). 
21 See Bush, supra note 19, at 116. 
22 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAw & ECON. I, 12-13 (1988). 
2! Id. at 22-23. 
24Id. at 23. 
2& See RICHARD POSNER, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 3 (Little, Brown & Co. 2d ed. 
1992). 
26 Richard Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REv. 
1551,1551 (1998). 
27 Bush, supra note 19, at 115-16. 
28 See POSNER, supra note 25, at 15; see, e.g., Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and the 
Securities Laws: opting Out of Securities Laws by Private Agreement, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 519, 
539 (1999). Government regulation is typically disfavored, although some limited inter-
vention is welcomed to enforce contracts, protect private property, and address imperfec-
tions in the marketplace. Id. 
29 See POSNER, supra note 25, at 335-36; see, e.g., Schwartz, What do I do for the Econo-
mists', 50 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 347, 348 (1999) (identifying inefficiencies in areas such as 
the former antitrust regulations with respect to mergers, government price fixing in trans-
portation, and restriction on competition among law firms). 
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does nothing; far too often, however, it aggravates the problem it at-
tempted to fix in the first place.so 
B. Law and Economics as Applied to Marriage 
Marriage, as a contractual relationship, falls within law and eco-
nomics analysis.S1 Like the marketplace, marriage allows for parties to 
contract for maximum utility.S2 Hence, proponents of law and eco-
nomics regularly view marriage through the economic lens.ss Unfor-
tunately, with same-sex marriage, law and economics theorists have 
been unjustifiably reluctant to make the application.s4 Yet, if same-sex 
marriage creates benefits that outweigh its externalities, then law and 
economics must advocate its recognition.s5 Although such an analysis 
is not the only one that can or should be made in defense of same-sex 
marriage, there is ample room for an argument that defends same-sex 
marriage as a policy that promotes economic efficiency. S6 By focusing 
on the pragmatics of same-sex marriage, law and economics avoids 
the emotionally-laden morality defenses that have dominated the de-
bate.s7 Such an argument may prove instrumental in winning over 
public sentiment.S8 
II. ECONOMIC COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
Because American society grants significant financial benefits to 
married couples, withholding of this status denies important benefits 
to same-sex couples. S9 U.S. law reflects the belief that economic shar-
ing and investment in a marriage are beneficial to the partners and to 
the larger society.4O Society expects married couples to make financial 
30 Bush, supra note 19, at 116; see POSNER, supra note 25, at 335-36. 
51 Bush, supra note 19, at 116. 
52Id. 
55 Id. 
54 See id.; see, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 313 (1992) (concluding that, 
even though the benefits of same-sex marriage may outweigh the costs, hostile public opin-
ion is too prevalen t to justify recognition of homosexual marriage). 
511 See Bush, supra note 19, at 116-17. 
56 See KOPPELMAN, supra note 4, at 71; Ball, Moral Foundations, supra note 18, at 1878; 
Ball, Sexual Ethics, supra note 18, at 373; Sparling, supra note 19, at 197; Wald, supra note 
16, at 339. 
57 See Bush, supra note 19, at 116-17; Wald, supra note 16, at 339. 
M See Waldron, supra note 20, at 611; see also Ball, Moral Foundations, supra note 18, at 
1942 (arguing that societal acceptance of same-sex marriage is dependent upon "commu-
nal recognition" that such unions are "normatively good"). 
59 See POSNER, supra note 34, at 311. 
40 See Wald, supra note 16, at 305. 
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decisions as a team.41 Therefore, American law protects marital part-
ners who contribute economically to the relationship, while simulta-
neously imposing significant economic penalties on partners who 
contribute to the dissolution of the relationship.42 These laws have a 
significantly beneficial impact on the married couple's economic well-
being, enabling the couple to make decisions to optimize their 
financial condition.411 In this way, the law assists the married couple 
and endorses the continuation of their relationship through financial 
incentives.44 
Same-sex couples can also create a more economically efficient 
partnership by using existing contract law to gain the legal benefits 
awarded to married couples.45 For example, same-sex couples can 
draft wills to ensure care for the surviving partner upon the other 
partner's death.46 They can seek powers of attorney to gain legal deci-
sion-making rights should one partner require medical intervention.47 
Couples can draft ante-nuptial agreements for division of property, 
thereby gaining some of the rights granted married partners in the 
event of divorce.48 There are, however, two problems with reliance on 
contracts to form a "legal marriage. "49 First, because marriage is a 
complex, long-term relationship, such contracts create substantial 
transaction costs.50 Any ambiguities in the contract do not have the 
benefit of developed case law. 51 Without recognition of status, courts 
may not enforce contracts for short-term relationships because they 
may resemble contracts for sex. Likewise, the courts may refuse to en-
force contracts for long-term "covenant" marriage because of the 
41 See id. 
42 See F. H. Buckley & Larry E. Ribstein, Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wan, 2001 U. 
ILL. L. REv. 561, 579; Wald, supra note 16, at 305,307; see, e.g., Adam Chase, Tax Planning 
for Same-Sex Couples, 72 DENV. U. L. REv. 359, 367 (1995) (observing that married couples 
have many state-inherited rights that activate upon dissolution of the relationship that 
same-sex couples do not have). 
45 SeeWald, supra note 16, at 308 . 
.. See id. at 305. 
45 Lisa M. Farabee, Marriage, Equal Protection, and New Judicial Federalism: A View from the 
States, 14 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 237, 239 (1996). 
46 Brown, supra note 19, at 785. 
47Id. 
48Id. 
49 Id. at 785-86. 
50 Id. at 785. Through contract, same-sex couples can approximate marriage, though 
at higher cost because fringe benefits and social insurance are often more generous for 
married than for single people. POSNER, supra note 34, at 292. 
51 Buckley &Ribstein, supra note 42, at 595. 
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problem of "over-optimism" at the time of marriage.52 Second, many 
benefits of marriage, such as employer medical benefits and tax de-
ductions, simply cannot be gained by private contract.53 Such costs 
make private contract a poor substitute for state recognition of same-
sex marriage.54 
A. Private Contracts Incur Significant Transaction Costs 
Because contracting the many benefits of a long-term committed 
relationship exacts heavy transaction costs, many gay men and lesbi-
ans are deterred from investing the time needed to draft such docu-
ments.55 Even if the couple enters into a contract, courts may choose 
not to uphold the terms, or the benefit may be dependent upon a 
third party recognizing the union of the same-sex couple.56 Two areas 
are particularly costly to gay men and lesbians: intestate succession of 
property and adoption and custody of children. 57 
1. Intestate Succession 
In 2000, the Washington Court of Appeals held that Frank 
Vasquez, a gay man, was not entitled to inherit his life partner's assets 
because members of the same sex cannot enter into a qualifying mari-
tal or quasi-marital relationship.58 Although the Washington Supreme 
Court later reversed the decision, remanding the case to the trial 
court for a trial on the merits, the case underscores the heavy transac-
tion costs inflicted on gay men and lesbians whose life partners die 
intestate or who make an invalid wil1.59 If an individual fails to make a 
valid will, the laws of in testate succession are triggered, which are 
52 Id. at 595-96. 
58 Brown, supra note 19, at 786. 
54Id. 
55 See Buckley & Ribstein, supra note 42, at 585; Cruz, supra note 17, at 1019; Wald, su-
pranote 16, at 336. 
56 SeeRaum v. Rest. Assocs., 675 N.Y.S.2d 343, 344 (App. Div. 1998) (denying unmar-
ried partners the right to bring wrongful death actions); Rutgers Chapter of AAUP Chap-
ters v. Rutgers, the State Univ., 689 A.2d 828, 829, 837 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (re-
fusing to extend coverage of school employees to their same-sex domestic partners 
because they were not considered "spouses" or "dependents"). 
57 See Gary Spitko, Judge Not: In Defense of Minority-Culture Arbitration, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 
1065,1080 (1999); Wald, supra note 16, at 808. 
58 Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 994 P.2d 240, 243 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000). 
59 Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 145 Wash.2d 103, 104-05 (2001); see MarissaJ. Holob, Note, 
Respecting Commitment: A Proposal to Prevent Legal Barriers from Obstructing the Effectuation of 
Intestate Goals, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1492, 1495 (2000) (citation omitted). 
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heavily biased toward traditional families. 60 Under the Uniform Probate 
Code, in accord with all but two United States jurisdictions, surviving 
non-marital partners do not receive intestate inheritance rights.61 The 
surviving partner of a same-sex union is therefore forced to litigate his 
or her rightful inheritance in the courts.62 
Eventually, the surviving partner may win some or all of the es-
tate.63 Even if the couple had established the proper combination of 
testamentary documents, lifetime transfers, and beneficiary designa-
tions, however, winning possession is a difficult and lengthy process; 
without formal documentation, the process becomes even more 
difficult.64 Without the legal right to a partner's assets, the survivor is 
often placed at the mercy of the deceased partner's relatives who are 
considered the legal heirs. 65 In order to win possession, the survivor 
would have to litigate his or her claim and demonstrate to the court 
the level of commitment to the deceased partner.66 Admittedly, same-
sex couples could contract to avoid the state's intestate succession 
laws.67 Many couples are reluctant or unable to do this, however, and 
inevitably, some same-sex couples will fail to execute wills before one 
of the partners dies.68 
60 See Holob, supra note 59, at 1495 (citation omitted). 
61 E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law and the Merits of non-Marital 
Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. REv. 1063, 1066 (1999). The UNIFORM PROBATE CODE grants all or 
most of the decedent's intestate estate to a surviving spouse, or, if there is none, to the 
decedent's descendants and then to members of his or her biological or adoptive family. 
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 2-101 to -103 (1993). 
62 SeeUNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-101 to -103 (1993); Spitko, supra note 61, at 1066. 
6S See Nancy J. Knauer, The September 11 Attacks and Surviving Same-Sex Partners: Defining 
Family Through Tragedy, 75 TEMP. L. REv. 31, 40 (2002). 
64 See id. 
65 See id. at 44. "The closet, homophobia, and the pressures of grief can greatly compli-
cate the relationship between a surviving partner and the next of kin, who may seek to 
justify dispossessing the surviving partner on the grounds that the couple were not really a 
couple or that the absence of a will is a clear statement of the decedent's intent to prefer 
family over a 'roommate. ,. Id. 
66 See Spitko, supra note 61, at 1080. 
67 See Brown, supra note 19, at 784-85. 
68 See Merrianne E. Dean, Estate Planning for Non-Traditional Families, 309 PRACTISING 
LAW INSTITUTE (PLI)/EsT. 1087, 1095 (2001) (observing that many gay and lesbian cou-
ples delay estate planning assistance because they are reluctant or afraid to disclose the 
nature of their relationships to a stranger); Knauer, supra note 63, at 37-38. 
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2. Adoption and Custody 
Same-sex couples also incur heavy transaction costs when adopt-
ing or seeking custody of children.69 When a same-sex couple has a 
child, only one partner can be the biological parent of the child.70 
Without legal recognition of same-sex marriage, it is therefore 
difficult for the non-biological same-sex partner to establish a legal 
relationship with the child.71 Thus, the same-sex couple must rely on 
the legal system to gain joint parental rights.72 
Unlike marriages where one of the adults is a step-parent, how-
ever, the same-sex partner of a person who has a child is not eligible 
for a step-parent adoption.73 Instead, the same-sex couple must secure 
a "second-parent adoption" from a court.74 This is a costly and lengthy 
process, the outcome of which depends on large part on the judge's 
feelings toward homosexuality.75 Unlike heterosexual step-parents, 
who are automatically eligible to adopt their partner's child, a peti-
tioning gay or lesbian parent faces extensive social work assessment to 
establish suitability, a process that is lengthy as well as being emotion-
ally and financially costly.76 Moreover, many states simply do not per-
mit such adoptions.77 Thus, even if the parents overcome the lengthy, 
69 Wald, supra note 16, at 308. Although the associated substantive costs to both the 
child and couple are beyond the scope of this paper, several authors have highlighted the 
restriction's negative impact. See id. at 310 (observing that the un-adopted child is not enti-
tled to financial support, nor may the non-biological parent file for custody or visitation 
rights, nor sign medical consent forms, thereby impacting the emotional bond between 
the child and the couple). 
70 Pamela Gatos, Note, Third-Parent Adoption in Lesbian and Gay Families, ~!6 VT. L. REv. 
195,205 (2001). 
71 Wald, supra note 16, at 308. 
72 Gatos, supra note 70, at 206. 
75 Wald, supra note 16, at 309. 
74Id. 
75 See Gatos, supra note 70, at 205; see, e.g., In re Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 
321-22 (Mass. 1993) (Nolan, j., dissenting) (refusing to agree that the couple's sexual 
orientation should not determine the outcome of the case). 
76Wald, supra note 16, at 309 (citation omitted). See, e.g., In reAdoption of Tammy, 619 
N.E.2d at 317 (noting that over a dozen witnesses testified as to the suitability of the same-
sex couple as parents, including mental health professionals, teachers, colleagues, neigh-
bors, blood relatives, and a priest and nun; the Department of Social Services conducted a 
thorough home study; and a court-appointed guardian ad litem conducted a thorough 
clinical assessment of the couple and the child). 
77 Wald, supra note 16, at 309. Florida has prohibited lesbian and gay second-parent 
adoptions through legislation. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1997). Wisconsin has 
prohibited it through strict interpretation of statutory language found in sections 48.81-
.82. See In The Interest of Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 686 (Wis. 1994) (reasoning that 
second-parent adoption would cause the biological parent to terminate parental rights). 
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costly obstacles in their path, a judge may simply choose not to 
authorize the adoption.78 
The high transaction cost of adoption, including the stress of en-
tering the legal system, submitting the family to standards rooted in 
homophobia, and the uncertainty of testing legal theories, deters 
many gay or lesbian non-biological parents from seeking legal adop-
tion of a child.79 Those that choose not to adopt face legal rules that 
consider one partner a parent and the other a legal stranger to the 
child.so Should the relationship dissolve, a costly custody battle often 
ensues, with the non-legal parent at a distinct disadvantage.81 In some 
jurisdictions, the non-legal parent is without standing to seek custody 
or even visitation rights in relation to the child he or she has helped 
to raise.82 In others, the parent would be at the same legal disadvan-
tage as a third party attempting to establish legal parent statuS.83 
Even though same-sex couples can contract many terms of their 
relationship, the associated costs are often prohibitive.84 Furthermore, 
contracting a family does not require just money but also access to the 
legal profession.85 The legal language alone is a deterrent from draft-
ing and filing declarations.86 As a result, many people who feel ex-
cluded from the legal system fail to claim the benefits and the rights 
States that do not provide for second-parent adoptions in their adoption statutes include: 
Arizona, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-103 (West 1999), Arkansas, ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-9-204 
(Michie 2002), Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 16-1501 (Michie 2001), KANSAS, KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 59-2113 (1994), Kentucky, Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.470 (Michie 1998), Louisiana, LA. 
CHILDREN'S CODE ANN. arts. 1198, 1202 (West 1995), Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A 
§ 9-103 (West 1964), Mississippi, MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3 (1972), Missouri, Mo. ANN. 
STAT. § 453.010 (West 1997), Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-1-106 (2001), North Caro-
lina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-2-301 (2001), South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1670 
(Law. Co-op. 1976), South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 25-6-2 (Michie 1999), Tennes-
see, TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-115 (2001), Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-1 (1953), Vir-
ginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-219.9 (Michie 2001), West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-
22-201 (Michie 2001), and Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-22-103 (Michie 2001). 
78 Wald, supra note 16, at 309. 
79 See Polikoff, supra note 16, at 526. 
80 Id. at 526-27. 
81 See id. at 309; see, e.g., T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 914 (Penn. 2001) (dispute regard-
ing the rights of a former lesbian partner who did not legally adopt the child she and her 
partner agreed to raise from birth); V.C. v. MJ.B., 748 A.2d 539, 541-42 (NJ. 2000). 
82 Spitko, supra note 57, at 1080. 
83 Id. 
84 See Buckley & Ribstein, supra note 42, at 595. 
815 See Nancy J. Knauer, Domestic Partnership and Same-Sex Relationships: A Marketplace In-
novation and a Less Than Perfect Institutional Choice, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REv. 337, 
360 (1998). 
86 Kris Franklin, Note, "A Family Like Any Other Family": Alternative Methods of Defining 
Family Law, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1027, 1071 (1990-91). 
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to which they are due.87 Furthermore, costly transactions are merely 
one inefficient market aspect of same-sex marriage; many legal rights 
common to married couples lie out of reach of private contract.88 
B. Private Contract Is Insufficient to Gain the Full Benefits of Marriage 
Despite the power of private contract, it is impossible for same-
sex couples to gain all of the benefits afforded married couples by 
contracting their relationships.89 Same-sex partners are excluded 
from insurance awards, social security benefits, public pensions, 
worker's compensation, income tax benefits, and estate tax benefits.90 
They cannot contract to sue for wrongful death of a spouse, to receive 
compensation given to families of crime victims, or to be appointed 
conservator or guardian of an invalid family member.91 Nor can they 
contract the right to make health care decisions for a family member 
or even to visit a loved one in a hospital or prison.92 Furthermore, ex-
clusionary zoning laws, restrictive statutory provisions, and narrow 
judicial constructions of the meaning of "family" discriminate against 
same-sex couples in their efforts to secure housing.911 Housing be-
comes further problematic for same-sex couples when applying for 
rent control, right of successorship, homeowner associations, and 
mortgages.94 
Moreover, same-sex couples are excluded from employee family 
health care, group insurance, discounted "family rates" in assorted 
organizations, and the ability to hold real estate by the entirety.95 This 
is particularly evident in the area of personal insurance benefits that 
employers extend to the families of employees.96 Gay and lesbian em-
ployees are often denied coverage of their same-sex partner because, 
being unable to marry, their partners are not considered "spouses" or 
87Id. 
88 Brown, supra note 19, at 786. 
89 Id. 
90 Kathleen Guzman, About Outing: Public Discourse, Private Lives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 
1531,1542 (1995). 
91 Id. at 1542-43 (citations omitted). 
92 Id. (citations omitted). 
95 Chase, supra note 42, at 366. 
94 Id. at 366-67. 
95 Guzman, supra note 90, at 1543. 
96 Nancy K. Kubasek et aI., Fashioning a Tolerable Domestic Partners Statute is an Environ-
ment Hostile to Same-Sex Marriages, 7 LAw & SEXUALITY 55, 82 (1997). 
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"dependents," as required by employers' benefit plans.97 Because 
same-sex partners generally do not fit the state definition of either 
spouses or dependents, insurance is not extended to cover both part-
ners.98 
Studies estimate that although marital partners automatically 
qualifY as financial dependents, a lesbian or gay man in a same-sex 
relationship receives employer-paid medical benefits of several thou-
sand dollars less per year than a similarly situated married person.99 
Some gay men and lesbians have attempted to litigate this inequality 
but have been met with limited success. IOO Courts are reluctant to ex-
tend benefits to same-sex partners, all the while denying assertions of 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or marital statuS. IOI 
This dissimilar treatment puts the same-sex couple at a strong 
disadvantage.102 Unlike their heterosexual counterparts, the same-sex 
couple is not as flexible to make financial decisions, such as allowing 
one partner to stay at home to raise the children. I03 If one partner in 
a same-sex couple chooses to sacrifice a career for the sake of the fam-
ily and the working partner is injured or killed, the other partner is 
left without compensation.104 Recognition of same-sex marriage 
would address this economic inefficiency by entitling same-sex part-
ners to legal protections such as life insurance, adoption, intestate 
inheritance, social security payments, income tax reductions, welfare 
payments, and property division, should the relationship dissolve.I05 
97 James P. Baker, Equal Benefits at Work' The Law of Domestic Partner Benefits, 14 LAB. 
LAw. 23, 25 (1998). 
98 See Dominick Vetri, Almost Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Lesbians and 
Gay Men, Their Families, and the Law, 26 S.U. L. REV. 1,68 (1998). 
99 Jean Reith Schroedel & Pamela Fiber, Lesbian and Gay Policy Priorities: Commonality 
and Difference, in THE POLITICS OF GAY RIGHTS 113, 115 (Craig A. Rimmerman et al. eds., 
2000). 
100 See Sue Nussbaum Averill, Note, Desperately Seeking Status: Same-Sex Couples Battle for 
Employment-Linked Benefits, 27 AKRON L. REV. 253, 256 (1993); see, e.g., Tanner v. Oregon 
Health Servs. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 505-06 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that employer's 
denial of insurance benefits to domestic partners of homosexual employees violated the 
state constitution but did not violate a state sex discrimination statute); Rutgers Council of 
AAUP Chapters v. Rutgers, the State Univ., 689 A.2d 828, 831 (NJ. Super. App. Div. 1997) 
(holding that denial of health care insurance coverage to same-sex partners was justified 
because such partners are not considered to be spouses). 
101 See Kate Latimer, Domestic Partners and Discrimination: The Need for Fair Employment 
Compensation, 12 HAMLINEJ. PUB. L. & POL'y 329, 339 (1991); see, e.g., Tanner, 971 P.2d at 
505-06; Rutgers, 689 A.2d at 831. 
102 See Wald, supra note 16, at 306. 
lOS [d. 
104 [d. 
105 POSNER, supra note 34, at 313. 
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Critics fear that recognition of same-sex marriage will lead to 
abuses of the benefits that marriage provides, such as immigration 
privileges and health care packages.I06 This concern, however, applies 
equally well to heterosexual marriage and hence, this argument is not 
a problem presented by recognition of same-sex marriage.to7 The so-
lution to this concern, therefore, lies not with the prohibition of 
same-sex marriage; rather, the problem must be handled by address-
ing the fraud. lOS For example, the potential of immigrants fabricating 
a marriage to avoid deportation is not addressed by a prohibition of 
marriages between American citizens and foreigners, but by penalties 
for fraudulent marriage.109 There is no reason why such penalties 
could not be enforced effectively against fraudulent same-sex mar-
riages in the same way.ll0 
With regard to employer health insurance packages, the fear of 
fraudulent marriage is also unjustified.111 This concern exists largely 
because companies feared substantial costs associated with the medi-
cal expenses of gay men and lesbians, specifically the increase in AIDS 
cases.112 These concerns, however, have proven unjustified by the ex-
perience of companies providing insurance to domestic partners.ll3 
Municipalities that led the way in extending domestic partnership 
health benefits have been surprised at how minimal the additional 
costs have been.114 Studies demonstrate that companies experienced a 
negligible rise in cost after offering same-sex domestic partner 
106 See id. at 313 (questioning whether a homosexual might marry a succession of AIDS 
patients in order to en tide them to spouse's medical benefits); Lindsay Brooke King, En-
forcing Conventional Morality Through Taxation7: Determining the Excludability of Employer-
Provided Domestic Partner Health Benefits Under Sections 105(b) and 106 of the Internal Revenue 
Code, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 301, 313-14 (1996). 
107 Bush, supra note 19, at 129. 
lOS See id. 
109 Id. 
uo Id. 
III See King, supra note 106, at 314. 
112 See id. at 315; see also Raymond C. O'Brien, Domestic Partnership: Recognition and RI'r 
sponsibility, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 163, 179 (1995). 
m See O'Brien, supra note 112, at 179. At least two health insurance companies have 
extended health benefits to same-sex domestic partners: Blue Cross and Blue Shield of 
Massachusetts and Kaiser Permanente of Northern California. Id. 
U4 See Kubasek et a1., supra note 96, at 82; Jarrett Tomas Barrios, Note, Growing Pains in 
the Workplace: Tax Consequences of Health Plans for Domestic Partners, 47 TAX LAW. 845, 847 
(1994). For example, the increased cost of providing health insurance to the domestic 
partners of city employees in Seatde, Washington increased the city's total costs for medi-
cal and dental coverage only 1.1 % between May through December, 1990. Kubasek et aI., 
supra, note 96, at 82. In Berkeley, California, the extension of dental benefits raised its 
premiums by only 2%. Id. 
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benefits, in part because the cost of AIDS treatment for an individual 
is typically less than the cost of covering other, more common health 
conditions, such as premature or multiple births, complications due 
to smoking or overeating, and cardiovascular problems.1l5 Given the 
small number of gays and lesbians who have enrolled for domestic 
partner benefits, the externalities imposed on society are minimal.116 
III. INFORMATIONAL COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
The increase in benefits to domestic partners and the recent rec-
ognition of civil unions in Vermont have caused some to argue that 
same-sex couples have a legal alternative to marriage, eliminating the 
need for the "marriage" label.117 This argument forgets, however, that 
a separate institution, such as a domestic partnership or a civil union, 
is not necessarily equal to the revered institution of marriage.11S 
When a couple communicates that they are "married," they estab-
lish that they are in a particular type of human relationship, charac-
terized by a mutual long-term commitment to one another.119 While 
couples may admittedly have differing goals in marriage, marital 
partners are still generally assumed to exchange intimacy, love, and 
commitment that are uniquely valuable to them.t 2o Marriage conveys 
a unified relationship, commonly characterized by the sharing of af-
fection and individual energies and efforts.121 To deny recognition of 
115 King, supra note 106, at 315-16 (citations omitted). 
116 See id. at 316; Richard Posner, Should There Be Homosexual Marriage1 And if so, Who 
Should Decide1, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1578, 1581 (1997) (realizing that, because there are sub-
stantially more heterosexuals than homosexuals, and because a much smaller fraction of 
homosexuals than of heterosexuals will marry, the costs of same-sex marriage to society, on 
a per capita basis, would be small). Other commentators have noted that same-sex mar-
riages will never amount to more than a very small proportion of American marriages 
because there are fewer homosexuals than heterosexuals. Wald, supra note 16, at 333. One 
of the most comprehensive national studies on sexual behavior found that approximately 
2.8% of men and 1.4% of women identify themselves as homosexual. Carlos A. Ball & 
Janice Farrell Pea, Warring with Wardle: Morality, Social Science, and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 
1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253, 284 (1998) (citing EDWARD O. LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL OR-
GANIZATION OF SEXUALITY: SEXUAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 297 (1994». 
117 See Greg Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions: The New Language of Marriage, 25 VT. L. REv. 
15, 19 (2000). 
liB See Cruz, supra note 17, at 1019; Michael Mello, For Today I'm Gay: The Unfinished 
Battle for Same-Sex Marriage in Vermont, 25 VT. L. REV. 149, 251 (2000); Wald, supra note 16, 
at 338. 
119 Ball, MoralFoundations, supra note 18, at 1939-40. 
120 Wald, supra note 16, at 302. 
121 See Vetri, supra note 98, at 45. 
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same-sex marriage is to deprive the couple of this highly exalted form 
of human association.122 
According to societal expectations, marriage also communicates 
to the married couple a sense of permanence and exclusivity.12!I Such 
conditions offer the marriage partners security, self-confidence, and 
freedom from a sense of alienation or isolation.124 A society that cares 
about its members will want them to experience the liberating and 
empowering gifts of marital love because such people will be more 
fulfilled, and thus more willing and able to contribute to their com-
munities.125 IT marriage is taken seriously, the marital habits of con-
stancy, trust, honesty, fairness, and compassion will be more prevalent 
in society.126 Marriage provides each partner with a sense of dignity 
and value; through this awareness of his or her own worth, a person 
can participate more effectively in society.127 Public acceptance of a 
married couple through legal recognition and ceremonial services 
helps to strengthen the couple's commitment to the relationship.128 
Conversely, same-sex unions have been limited to alternative la-
bels, such as "domestic partnerships" and "civil unions," which fail to 
convey the same powerful societal message underlying the term "mar-
riage. "129 Even if a state, like Vermont, were to pass a statute that par-
alleled marriage in its legal provisions, it would be sending a message 
that these unions are essentially "second class units" and somehow 
unworthy of the marriage tide.130 Societal attitudes are critical in help-
ing couples remain committed to one another.131 As long as lesbians 
and gay men are not fully accepted, their unions will "suffer from 
pressures to which the marriages and dating relationships of straight 
couples are never subjected. "132 
Critics of same-sex marriage contend that its recognition would 
bring an information cost by diluting or obscuring the meaning of 
marriage.133 Under the conventional definition of marriage. a woman 
122 Ball, Moral Foundations, supra note 18, at 1940. 
12S Chartier, supra note 1, at 1620. 
124Id. at 1621. 
125Id. 
126 Id. 
127Id. 
128 Chartier, supra note 1, at 1622. 
129 See Cruz, supra note 17, at 1019. 
I!IO Wald, supra note 16, at 338. 
mId. 
U2 Chartier, supra note 1, at 1622. 
us POSNER, supra note 34, at 312. 
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referring to her "spouse" clearly communicates her marriage to a man 
(as opposed to a woman).134 According to critics, if same-sex mar-
riages were recognized, this assumption no longer holds, thereby im-
posing an information cost.135 Although admittedly valid, such costs 
are slight when weighed against the benefit that same-sex couples 
would receive from being able to use the term "marriage" to signal 
the extent of their mutual commitment.136 
Non-recognition of same-sex marriage is a form of social control 
of gay men and lesbians.137 It enforces the cultural belief that same-
sex relationships are not the equivalent of heterosexual marriages 
and, therefore, not deserving of equal respect.138 This creates obsta-
cles for the same-sex couple in its efforts to remain committed to one 
another for life.1!19 Thus, same-sex couples are less likely to set down 
roots in local communities or to invest time and energy in making 
those communities thrive.140 Civil society depends on an array of in-
tertwined communities, marriage being among the most important. HI 
Strong marriages assist in the growth and flourishing of healthy 
communities, and prohibiting marriage on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion harms both the couple and society.142 
CONCLUSION 
In his book, The Gay Rights QJlestion in Contemporary American Law, 
Andrew Koppelman demonstrates the powerful legal and moral case 
for the equal treatment of gay men and lesbians.14!1 He supports his 
position by suggesting that the issue of gay rights closely resembles the 
dispute over same-sex marriage.144 The right to privacy, the problem 
of sex discrimination, the constitutional requirement of interstate 
consistency, and fallacies within the new natural law theory work to-
1M Seeid. 
1M See id. 
136 Id. at 311. Posner points out that recognition of same-sex marriage would raise the 
self-esteem of lesbians and gay men. Id. 
157 Vetri, supra note 98, at 47. 
136 Seeid. 
159 See Wald, supra note 16, at 338. 
140 Chartier, supra note I, at 1621. 
141 Id. at 1622. 
142 See id.; Wald, supra note 16, at 339. 
145 KOPPELMAN, supra note 4, at 35,53, 72,94. 
144 See id. at 73. 
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gether to provide a strong argument in favor of same-sex marriage 
recognition.145 
Unfortunately, Koppelman does not provide a pragmatic analysis 
of same-sex marriage. l46 In focusing on legal and moral issues, he fails 
to address the "condition of legal inferiority" imposed on same-sex 
couples in a society that denies them the legal benefits of marriage.147 
Although his analyses are sound, they fail to compel the conclusion 
that same-sex marriage should be imposed by the courts.l48 Instead, 
he states that "[civil unions are] the most that gays can possibly hope 
for, at least in the next few years. "149 
The value of law and economics lies not in proving that same-sex 
marriage is a constitutional imperative, but in educating Americans 
that non-recognition is costly and unjustified,150 This economic ap-
proach could have been the final missing step that Koppelman im-
plied was necessary for the judiciary to be able to act in a politically 
hostile environment.151 The courts are aware, and even admit, that a 
sudden change in marriage laws could have disruptive and unfore-
seen consequences.152 These consequences, however, are due in large 
part to the unwillingness of Americans to grant equal status to same-
sex couples.15!! The unwillingness stems from decades of misinforma-
tion, confusion, and disgust. l54 By demonstrating the overwhelming 
benefits that same-sex marriage would bring to gay men, lesbians, and 
society, law and economics provides courts with the needed "good 
reason" that Koppelman deems necessary for the judiciary to be 
armed with entering the debate,155 
145 Id. at 35, 53, 72, 94. 
146 See id. at 72-93. 
147 See Barbara J. Cox, But Why Not Marriage: An Essay on Vermont's Civil Union Law, Same-
Sex Marriage, and Separate But (Un)equa~ 25 VT. L. REv. 113, 135 (2000). 
148 See KOPPELMAN, supra note 4, at 145. 
149 Id. 
150 See POSNER, supra note 34, at 308 (arguing that even if a gay man is likely to be less 
happy than a heterosexual man, this is, in itself, a reason to remove obstacles such as mar-
riage prohibition "in order to alleviate gratuitous suffering"). 
151 KoPPELMAN, supra note 4, at 145. 
152 Id. at 141; seeBakerv. State, 744A.2d 864, 887 (Vt. 1999). 
15! See Battaglia, supra note 2, at 206-07; Lin, supra note 2, at 741-42; Wald, supra note 
16, at 339. 
154 See Battaglia, supra note 2, at 206-07; Lin, supra note 2, at 741-42; Wald, supra note 
16, at 339. 
155 SeeKoPPELMAN, supra note 4, at 145. 
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The courts, remarkably ahead of public opinion on the issue of 
same-sex marriage, presently exercise caution when addressing it,156 
Same-sex marriage recognition would be a dramatic change to a well-
established social tradition, and history has shown that sudden accep-
tance by the courts is likely to trigger political backlash.157 Marriage, 
as a settled and fundamental social institution, is not prone to wel-
coming radical changes.158 As noted by Edmund Burke, "it is with 
infinite caution that any man ought to venture upon pulling down an 
edifice which has answered in any tolerable degree for ages the com-
mon purposes of society. "159 
Even though settled tradition may strengthen the case for tradi-
tional marriage, however, it does not serve as an independent reason 
to reject change.160 Society's particular definition of the institution 
does not therefore make the definition correct, and if the case for 
same-sex marriage is persuasive in other respects, then change must 
be made, despite the longstanding definition. 161 
156 KOPPELMAN, supra note 4, at 141, 144. Koppelman supports this assertion with Pos-
ner's comment that public opinion may change, but at present, it is too firmly against 
same-sex marriage for the courts to act. Id. at 144-45. Posner's suggestion is to "[allow] the 
matter to simmer for a while before the heavy artillery of constitutional rightsmaking is 
trundled out." Id. at 145; see, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (striking down 
Colorado's Amendment 2, which prohibited government-backed preferential treatment of 
homosexuals, because it was motivated by animus); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 911 (Vt. 
1999) (holding that same-sex couples are entitled, under the state constitution, to the 
same legal benefits as heterosexual married couples); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 
(Haw. 1993) (holding that denial of same-sex marriage is gender discrimination); Brause v. 
Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562CI, 1998 WL 88743, at *6 (Alaska Feb. 27, 1998) 
(holding that denial of marriage license to same-sex couples violates state constitution). 
157 See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67. After Hawaii's Supreme Court ruled that the state consti-
tution required recognition of same-sex marriage, voters overruled the decision by passing 
a constitutional amendment. See id.; KOPPELMAN, supra note 4, at 142. A similar amend-
men t passed in Alaska after a district court ordered recognition of a same-sex marriage. See 
Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *6; KOPPELMAN, supra note 4, at 142; Buckley & Ribstein, supra 
note 42, at 580. 
158 Buckley & Ribstein, supra note 42, at 580. 
159 EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION OF FRANCE 31 (Oxford 1993) 
(1790), quoted in Buckley & Ribstein, supra note 42, at 580. 
160 Buckley & Ribstein, supra note 42, at 581; see also Mark Tanney, The Defense of Mar-
riage Act: A "Bare Desire to Harm" an Unpopular Minority Cannot Constitute a Legitimate Govern-
ment Interest, 19 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 99, 119 (1997) (stating that defending marriage as 
strictly heterosexual "because 'it has always been that way' is simply wrong"); Desiree 
Alonso, Note, Immigration Sponsorship Rights for Gay and Lesbian Couples: Defining Partner-
ships, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN'S LJ. 207, 230 (2002) (observing that change related to sexual 
identity is particularly threatening, which makes "tradition" a natural and easy argument 
for conservatives to make). 
161 Buckley & Ribstein, supra note 42, at 581. 
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Marriage is a loving, caring relationship that provides intimacy 
and security.162 It is a legal status and a social institution that simplifies 
and organizes crucial matters for the partners. 1M Denial of this status 
to an already disadvantaged group of people creates market 
inefficiency.164 Thus, the evidence demonstrates that same-sex mar-
riage would empower gay men and lesbians to be able to participate 
more fully in society.165 Continued non-recognition, on the other 
hand, perpetuates the disdain that society harbors against gay men 
and lesbians and flies in the face of economic efficiency.1OO Gay men, 
lesbians, their children, and Americans as a whole will all be better off 
when we recognize the case for same-sex marriage.167 
162 Vetri, supra note 98, at 45. 
1MId. 
164 See POSNER, supra note 34, at 308. 
166 SeeWald, supra note 16, at 339. 
166 See Bush, supra note 19, at 137; Wald, supra note 16, at 338. 
167 See Wald, supra note 16, at 344. 
